Security measures are said to increase the price of terrorism. This price has not hitherto been defined in an economically nieanitigfi~l way. This paper provides a precise definitiou by treating tlic terrorists' resource endownielit as a parcel of contingent claims to political influence witli a price equal to the su~inned value of those contingent claims in potential states of the world. Equipped witli this definition, an equilibriuln model of the price of terrorism is constructed. Important insights are gained into the effect of terrorists' risk aversion on the level of the price of terrorism in different states of the world and the theoretical co~~clusion is reached that higher security is associated with a lower price of terrorism rather than a higher price. The in~plications for policy are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The effect of lliglier security on terrorist beliaviour is a matter of considerable impol-tance, not only to the governments who must set the policy but also to the citizens of the world who wish to live in democratic freedom and peace. Some important questions have emerged over the past two decades as economists began to devote more attention to the application of econolnic analysis to terrorism. Specifically, does higher security increase the price of terrorism? Is the reverse true? What is nature of the price of terrorism? Although these questious have been an implicit subject in many studies and investigations over the past two decades, they remain largely unanswered. This is due to the absence in the econoniics of terrorism literature of a complete and rigorous statement of what exactly constitutes the price of terrorism. This paper will attempt to fill this gap in the theoretical economics of terrorism literature. This paper is orgatiised as follows. Section 2 is a discussion of the basic features of econon~ic analyses of terrorism. This discussion focuses on the application of subjective
